Will of God

Herman Bavinck (1854-1921)

Both in the O.T. and in the N.T., Scripture teaches that God’s will is eternal, immutable, independent, and efficacious. This truth is not only expressed in a few passages, e.g., Ps. 33:11; 115:3; Dan. 4:25,35; Is. 36:10; Mt. 11:26; Rom. 9:18; Eph. 1:4; Rev. 4:11; etc., but is either expressed or implied everywhere in Scripture, is demanded by all God’s attributes, and is evidenced by the entire history of the church and of the world. Hence, the Christian church, especially since Augustine, taught that God’s will is single (simple), eternal and immutable, identical with his being. God’s antecedent will is not really a will; ‘it should rather be called a willingness than an absolute will.’ God’s expressed or signified will is called God’s will in a metaphorical sense, ‘just as when any one lays down a precept, it is sign that he wishes that precept obeyed.’ The real will in God is the ‘will of God’s good pleasure,’ identical with God’s being, immutable and efficacious. Pelagians abandoned this correct view, and raised a mere desire, an unfulfilled wish to the dignity of a will. By doing this it came into conflict with the very being of God, with all his attributes; for if God’s real will be a mere ‘willingness,’ he is robbed of his omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, immutability, independence, etc; the universe ceases to be governed by his providence; an insoluble dualism is created between God’s purpose and the actual result of the history of the world. This result will be an everlasting disappointment for God; his plan for the history of the world suffers shipwreck, and in the end Satan triumphs. Now Pelagianism maintains that it takes this position with a view to God’s holiness, and that Paul and Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Calvin fail to do justice to this attribute seeing that in their system God is made the Author of sin. But this is true in appearance only, not in reality. Pelagianism does not explain the problem of sin any better than does Calvinism (Augustine, Calvin, etc.); on the contrary, the latter does justice to God’s holiness, for it is more in accordance with Scripture and with Christian faith in general to believe that for good reasons, unknown to us, God in a certain sense willed sin, than to think that God permits and tolerates sin though he did not in any sense will it. The latter position (Pelagianism) is in conflict with God’s holiness and with his omnipotence, not the former.

In connection with this it should be born in mind that though Scripture, theologically, places the decretive will in the foreground, nevertheless by means of its doctrine of the signified or revealed will it makes clear in which sense God does not will sin. By means of the ‘signs’ of prohibition, warning, admonition, chastisement, punishment, etc., God reveals himself to us, and tells us what he requires of us. Because man is a rational, moral being, God does not treat him as if he were a stone or a log but deals with him and addresses him in accordance with his nature. Just as a father forbids his child to touch a sharp knife though he himself uses it without injury or damage, so God forbids us to sin though he himself is able to use and does use sin as a means of self-glorification. The usual objection advanced against the decretive (secret) will and the preceptive (revealed) will, namely, that they are in conflict with each other, is not justifiable, for: the preceptive will is really not God’s will but his precept for our conduct; by means of it God does not reveal to us what he will do; it is not a law for his conduct; but it tells us what we must do; it is a rule for our conduct, Deut. 29:29. It is called God’s will in a metaphorical sense. The objection is advanced, however, that the preceptive or revealed will bears that name because it reveals what God really wills, and that it must, therefore, be in harmony with his decretive will. With this we agree: the preceptive will reveals what God wills that we should do. The decretive will and the preceptive will do not conflict in the sense that according to the first God takes pleasure in sin, but according to the second he does not; that according to the former he does not desire the salvation of every individual, but according to the latter he does, etc. Even according to the decretive will God takes no pleasure in sin: it is not an object of his delight, neither does he afflict willingly. And even according to the preceptive will God does not will the salvation of every individual. History very plainly gives the lie to the idea that God wills to save every individual: the word ‘all’ in 1 Tim. 2:4 (‘who would have all men to be saved...’) is given a restricted meaning by every interpreter. God’s revealed will instead of being opposed to the secret will is the means whereby the latter is carried out: by means of warnings and admonitions, prohibitions and threatenings, conditions and commandments, God’s counsel is accomplished; while because of the decretive will man, when he transgresses God’s commandment does not for a moment become independent of God but in the very act of transgressing serves God’s counsel, and becomes an instrument (however unwillingly) of God’s glory. Not only God’s revealed will but also his decretive will is holy, and wise, and good, and will become manifest as such in the way of righteousness and obedience to the law. Hence, the distinction between the two should be maintained. The problem of what is and what ought to be, of history and idea, of reality and morality, of what actually happens and what should happen, meets us here. Those who deny the revealed will do injustice to God’s holiness, the majesty of the moral law, and the seriousness of sin; while those who reject the decretive will come in conflict with God’s omnipotence, wisdom, and sovereignty. Thus one either falls into the error of superficial optimism, so that he does not see things as they really are, and calls things reasonable because they are real; or, accepting the other extreme position, he becomes a one-sided pessimist, begins to curse the day of his birth, and to despair of the universe and of destiny. Theism, however, does not seek the solution by canceling one of the terms of the problem, but accepts and maintains both; it knows that the problem of what is and what ought to be is met with in every instance of history: it refers both to God’s sovereignty which it esteems very highly and which it regards as being fully able to effect the execution of God’s wise decree in such a manner that his name is glorified even by means that are contrary to holiness and reasonableness. In this God’s sovereignty shines forth most marvelously, namely, that in the foolishness of men his wisdom is exalted, in their weakness his strength, in their sin his righteousness.

(From: “The Doctrine of God” )

John Calvin (1509-1564)

God’s will is a unity

While hitherto I have recounted only those things which are openly and unambiguously related in Scripture, let those who do not hesitate to brand the heavenly oracles with sinister marks of ignominy see what kind of censure they use. For if they seen from pretending ignorance to be praised for moderation, what haughtier thing can be imagined than to oppose God’s authority with one little word such as “To me it seems otherwise,” or, “I do not want to touch upon this”? But if they openly curse, what will they gain by spitting at the sky? Indeed, an example of such petulance is not new, for in every age there have been impious and profane men, who have frothed and snarled against this portion of doctrine. But they shall surely feel to be true what the Spirit declared of old through David’s mouth, that God may overcome when he is judged [Ps. 50:6, Vg.; 51:4, EV]. David indirectly reproves the madness of men in the very unbridled license with which, out of their own filthiness, they not only argue against God, but claim for themselves the power to condemn him. Meanwhile, he briefly warns that the blasphemies they spew out against heaven do not reach God, but that he, dispelling their clouds of calumnies, makes his own righteousness shine forth. Even our faith (because, founded upon God’s Sacred Word, it is above the whole world [cf. I John 5:4]) from its lofty height despises these clouds.

For it easy to dispose of their first objection, that if nothing happens apart from God’s will, there are in him two contrary wills, because by his secret plan he decrees what he has openly forbidden by his law. Yet before I answer, I should like my readers again to be warned that this cavil is not hurled against me but against the Holy Spirit, who surely put this confession in the mouth of the holy man Job, “As it pleased God, so was it done” [Job 1:21, cf. Vg.]. When he had been robbed by thieves, in their unjust acts and evil-doing toward him he recognized God’s just scourge. What does Scripture say elsewhere? Eli’s sons did not obey their father because God willed to slay them [I Sam. 2:25]. Another prophet also proclaims that “God, who resides in heaven, does whatever he pleases” [Ps. 115:3]. And now I have already shown plainly enough that God is called the Author of all the things that these faultfinders would have happen only by his indolent permission. He declares that he creates light and darkness, that he forms good and bad [Isa. 45:7 p.]; that nothing evil happens that he himself has not done [Amos 3:6]. Let them tell me, I pray, whether he exercises his judgments willings or unwillingly. Yet, as Moses teaches, he who is killed by a chance slip of the ax has been divinely given over to the striker’s hand. [Deut. 19:5; cf. Ex. 21:13.]

Thus, according to Luke, the whole church says that Herod and Pilate conspired to do what God’s hand and plan had decreed. [Acts 4:28.] And indeed, unless Christ had been crucified according to God’s will, whence would we have redemption? Yet God’s will is not therefore at war with itself, nor does it change, nor does it pretend not to will what he wills. But even though his will is one and simple in him, it appears manifold to us because, on account of our mental incapacity, we do not grasp how in divers ways it wills and does not will something to take place. When Paul said that the calling of the Gentiles was “a mystery hidden” [Eph. 3:9], he added shortly thereafter that in it was shown forth “God’s manifold wisdom” [Eph. 3:10]. Because God’s wisdom appears manifold (or “multiform” as the old translator renders it), ought we therefore, on account of the sluggishness of our understanding, to dream that there is any variation in God himself, as if he either may change his plan or disagree with himself? Rather, when we do not grasp how God wills to take place what he forbids to be done, let us recall our mental incapacity, and at the same time consider that the light in which God dwells is not without reason called unapproachable [I Tim. 6:16], because it is overspread with darkness. Therefore all godly and modest folk readily agree with this saying of Augustine: “Sometimes with a good will a man wills something which God does not will....For example, a good son wills that his father live, whom God wills to die. Again, it can happen that the same man wills with a bad will what God wills with a good will. For example, a bad son wills that his father die; God also wills this. That is, the former wills what God does not will; but the latter wills what God also wills. And yet the filial piety of the former, even though he wills something other than God wills, is more consonant with God’s good will than the impiety of the latter, who wills the same things as God does. There is a great difference between what is fitting for man to will and what is fitting for God, and to what end the will of each is directed, so that it be either approved or disapproved. For through the bad wills of evil men God fulfills what he righteously wills.” A little before he had said that by their defection the apostate angels and all the wicked, from their point of view, had done what God did not will, but from the point of view of God’s omnipotence they could in no way have done this, because while they act against God’s will, his will is done upon them. Whence he exclaims: “Great are God’s works, sought out in all his wills” [Ps. 111:2; cf. Ps. 110:2, Vg.]; so that in a wonderful and ineffable manner nothing is done without God’s will, not even that which is against his will. For it would not be done if he did not permit it; yet he does not unwillingly permit it, but willingly; nor would he, being good, allow evil to be done, unless being also almighty he could make good even out of evil.”

(From: “Institutes of the Christian Religion” )

I freely acknowledge that Christ is speaking of the revealed will of God, when He says, “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together,...and ye would not.” For He is upbraiding the Jews with the same ingratitude and hardness of heart as He had before done in the song of Moses (Exod. xv. 17, etc.). And we know full well that God did in reality bestow on the Jewish nation all the blessings which the words of that song expresses, seeing that, by giving them His law, by the ordinances of His worship, and by the many benefits which He conferred on that people, and by which He bound them to Himself, He protected them, as it were, by the overshadowing of His wings; and He would still have done so, had not their indomitable obstinacy and obduracy carried them away from Him. After, therefore, Christ had testified His will so often and in so many different ways, spoken in order to win a perverse nation to their obedience, but all in vain; it is with the utmost justice that He complains of their ingratitude. For, as to your restricting all these things to the lifetime of Christ, this you do with your usual ignorance of these divine things. Just as if Christ were not the true God, who, from the beginning, had not ceased to spread the wings of grace over His own elect people! But here you, in a moment, conclude that, if there were another and secret will in Christ, while He thus addressed Jerusalem, the whole life of Christ must have been an inconsistency. Just as if, to allure by the voice and by kindnesses, and yet to leave the heart untouched by the inspiration of His secret Spirit, were in Christ diverse and contrary acts!

(From: “The Secret Providence of God”)

John Knox (c.1514-1572)

If you ask if God hath two wills by reason that He hath a secret will and a revealed will? I answer, that as God in His eternal Godhead is simple and one, so is His will is respect of Himself from all beginning simple and one. But because the instruments be diverse therefore hath God’s will, which in Himself is one, diverse considerations, effects and ends in respect of the diverse instruments.

(From: “Works” )

John Owen (1616-1683)

“Divinum velle est ejus esse,” say the schoolmen, “The will of God is nothing but God willing;” not differing from his essence “secundem rem,” in the thing itself, but only “secundem rationem,” in that it importeth a relation to the thing willed. The essence of God, then, being a most absolute, pure, simple act or substance, his will consequently can be but simply one; whereof we ought to make neither division or distinction. If that whereby it is signified were taken always properly and strictly for the eternal will of God, the differences hereof that are usually given are rather distinctions of the signification of the word than of the thing.

In which regard they are not only tolerable, but simply necessary, because without them it is utterly impossible to reconcile some places of Scripture seemingly repugnant. In the 22nd chapter of Genesis, verse 2, God commandeth Abraham to take his only son Isaac, and offer him for a burnt-offering in the land of Moriah. Here the words of God are declarative of some will of God unto Abraham, who knew it ought to be, and little thought but that it should be, performed; but yet, when he actually addressed himself to his duty, in obedience to the will of God, he receiveth a counterman, verse 12, that he should not lay his hand upon the child to sacrifice him. The event plainly manifesteth that it was the will of God that Isaac should not be sacrificed; and yet notwithstanding, by reason of his command, Abraham seems before bound to believe that it was well-pleasing unto God that he should accomplish what he was enjoined. If the will of God in the Scripture be used but in one acceptation, here is a plain contradiction. Thus God commands Pharaoh to let his people go. Could Pharaoh think otherwise, nay, was he not bound to believe that it was the will of God that he should dismiss the Israelites at the first hearing of the message? Yet God affirms that he would harden his heart, that he should not suffer them to depart until he had showed his signs and wonders in the land of Egypt. To reconcile these and the like places of Scripture, both the ancient fathers and schoolmen, with modern divines, do affirm that the one will of God may be said to be divers or manifold, in regard of the sundry manners whereby he willeth those things to be done which he willeth, as also in other respects, and yet, taken in its proper signification, is simply one and the same. The vulgar distinction of God’s secret and revealed will is such as to which all the others may be reduced; and therefore I have chosen it to insist upon.

The secret will of God is his eternal, unchangeable purpose concerning all things which he hath made, to be brought by certain means to their appointed ends: of this himself affirmeth, that “his counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure,” Isa. xlvi. 10. This some call the absolute, efficacious will of God, the will of his good pleasure, always fulfilled; and indeed this is the only proper, eternal, constant, immutable will of God, whose order can neither be broken nor its law transgressed, so long as with him there is neither change nor shadow of turning.

The revealed will of God containeth not his purpose and decree, but our duty,–not what he will do according to his good pleasure, but what we should do if we will please him; and this, consisting in his word, his precepts and promises, belongeth to us and our children, that we may do the will of God. Now this, indeed, is rather to theleton than to thelema, that which God willeth, rather than his will, but termed so as we call that the will of a man which he hath determined shall be done: “This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have eternal life,” saith our Saviour, John vi. 40; that is, this is that which his will hath appointed. Hence it is called “voluntas signi,” or the sign of his will, metaphorically only called his will, saith Aquinas; for inasmuch as our commands are the signs of our wills, the same is said of the precepts of God. This the rule of our obedience, and whose transgression makes an action sinful; for hamartia estin h anomia, “sin is the transgression of the law,” and that such a law as is given to the transgressor to be observed. Now, God hath not imposed on us the observation of his eternal decree and intention; which, as it is utterly impossible for us to transgress or frustrate, so were we unblamable if we should. A master requires of his servant to do what he commands, not to accomplish what he intends, which perhaps is never discovered unto him; nay, the commands of superiors are not always signs that the commander will have the things commanded actually performed (as in all precepts for trial), but only that they who are subjects to this command shall be obliged to obedience, as far as the sense of it doth extend. “Et hoc clarum est in praeceptis divinis,” saith Durand, etc,–“And this is clear in the commands of God,” by which we are obliged to do what he commandeth; and yet it is not always his pleasure that the thing itself, in regard of the event, shall be accomplished, as we saw before in the examples of Pharaoh and Abraham.

(From: “Works” )

Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661)

It is against the wisdom of God to intend and will that the reprobate be redeemed, pardoned, saved, upon a condition which he himself only can work by his grace, and absolutely and irresistibly will not work. Now in Scripture such a thing is argued not to be done, because the Scripture must be fulfilled and the decree of God and his will fulfilled, as, Christ’s bones, upon this ground, could not be broken; and such a thing is done that the Scripture and so the will and decree of God might be fulfilled; so that which is never done is simply God’s will it shall never be done, that which is done is simply God’s will it must be; I mean either his permissive or approving will; and the will of God revealing what is the duty of reprobates, though it never be done, argues it was not simply the will of God; hence the voluntas signi, in which God reveals what is our duty, and what we ought to do, not what is his decree, or what he either will or ought to do, is not God’s will properly, but by a figure only, for commands and promises and threatenings revealed argue not the will and purpose, decree or intention of God, which are properly his will.

(From: “Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himself”)

Francis Turretin (1623-1687)

There cannot be contrariety between these two wills because they do not will and nill the same thing in the same manner and respect. The will of purpose is the will of event and execution. The signified will is the will of duty and of the obligation to it. Thus God willed the immolation of Isaac by a will of sign as to the preception (i.e., he prescribed it to Abraham as a test of his obedience), but he nilled it by a beneplacit will as the event itself because he had decreed to prohibit the slaughter. Now although these two acts of the divine will are diverse (“I will to command Abraham to slay his son” and “I do not will that immolation”), yet they are not contrary, for both were true–that God both decreed to enjoin this upon Abraham and equally decreed to hinder the effecting of it. Hence God without controversy willed Isaac to be offered up and not to be offered up. He willed it as to the precept, but nilled it as to the effect. The whole will of God about this affair was not either only to command Abraham to make that sacrifice or to hinder it, but ought to embrace those two diverse acts (the former of which is affirmative, occupied with the injunction of the thing; and the latter negative, respecting the hindrance of it). Nor does it follow from this that man is ordered to believe what is false. For we are ordered to believe what is revealed just because it is revealed. However the event is not already revealed by a command of this kind, but only the duty and the obligation to it.

(From: “Institutes of Elenctic Theology”)